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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
of the 
' .. ,.....,., ~...._· . 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERNE J. OBERHANSLY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
TRAVELERS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
On September 28, 1953, defendant Travelers Insur-
ance Company issued to LaMar Pearce Auto Mart its 
standard comprehensive liability policy with attached 
amendments (see Exhibit "A"), which policy was in 
force at the time of the accident hereinafter referred to. 
On November 27, 1953, plaintiff sustained an injury 
whil~ riding in a car registered in the name of Pearce's 
wife, but being driven by LaMar Pearce, President of 
Pearce Auto Mart, upon which he ultimately recovered 
a judgment for the sum of $9,112.23. Pearce and his 
company were insolvent and unable to pay the judg-
ment, whereupon plaintiff filed this action against 
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Travelers Insurance Company seeking to recover the 
amount of his judgment. Defendant defended the action 
upon three counts : 
(1) That at the time of the accident plaintiff was 
either an employee of Pearce Auto Mart or it was an 
obligation for which the insured may be held liable under 
the Workmen's Compensation Law of this State and 
therefore expressly excluded under the terms of the 
policy. 
( 2) That the insured failed to cooperate with the 
insurer in the defense of the action and notwithstanding 
the company's request willfully and in violation of the 
terms of the policy Pearce failed and refused to attend 
the trial; failed to give evidence thereat as required by 
the terms and provisions of the policy. 
(3) That Pearce and his business associate, Keith 
Oberhansly, brother of the plaintiff, conspired to rendel" 
aid to plaintiff thereby assisting him in procuring the 
judgment by 
. . (a) permitting Keith Oberhansly, brother of 
plaintiff, to testify contrary to a written 
statement made bv him on or about January 
1, 1954,and 
(b) by defendant Pearce's refusal to attend the 
trial, to assist in the defense of the action and 
failing to offer hin1self as a witness in his own 
behalf and in behalf of the company. 
A jury was impaneled but upon conclusion of all of 
the evidence plaintiff moved for an instructed verdict 
and defendant moved for judgment of dis1nissal. Both 
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parties having moved to take the case from the jury 
for the reason that there was no issuable facts to be 
presented to a jury, the Court thereupon dismissed the 
jury and thereafter made and entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
Neither party is complaining as to the action of the Court 
in dismissing the jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
As we view the record, there is no dispute as to the 
facts in this case. We shall briefly summarize these 
facts: 
Status of Plaintiff 
First Defense 
While Keith Oberhansly was not formally admitted 
to tl' .... a corporation as an officer or stockholder, yet it was 
the understanding of the parties that he would be made 
an officer of the company and share equally in the 
profits. He was working full time at the company's place 
of business under an agreement that he was to receive 
one-half of the profits derived from the operation of said 
business. His relationship to the company was character-
ized by Pearce as a partnership arrangement. Pearce 
Auto Mart was a dealer in used cars. As a part of its 
regular business it accepted for sale used cars from 
various ·owners delivered to it on consignment for sale 
upon a commission basis. Under this arrangement it had 
accepted a number of used cars from Spencer Auto 
Company of Evanston, Wyoming. 
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For convenience we shall hereafter designate Pearce 
as LaMar; his business associate as Keith, and the plain-
tiff as Verne. 
LaMar and Keith were having financial difficulties 
and they decided to return two remaining unsold cars 
to Spencer Auto Company at Evanston, Wyoming. They 
called Verne and asked him if he would drive one of these 
cars. He indicated a willingness to do so and immedi-
ately thereafter came to the company's place of business, 
whereupon it was agreed between LaMar, Keith and 
Verne that Verne and Keith would drive the two con-
signed cars and LaMar would follow them in the insured 
car and bring them back to Ogden. The return of these 
cars constituted a part· of the regular and customary 
business. In fact 'r erne had on at least one or two pre-
vious occasions performed a similar service. Verne 
stated that he would drive the car provided he was· fur-
nished sufficient money to defray the expenses incident 
to said trip. He was given $10.00 and sufficient gas 
and oil was purchased by him at cost of between $4.00 
and $5·~oo. Keith and Verne left Ogden about 3 :00 o'clock 
P~M. and LaMar left some time later and overtook them 
at Echo Junction and then followed them to Evanston. 
The cars were delivered. The three then had dinner and 
then started on the return trip to Ogden. LaMar was 
the driver. The accident occurred at a point known as 
Devil's Gate in Weber Canyon during the course of the 
return journey. Verne sustained injuries which resulted 
in the judgment. 
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Failure to ()ooperate 
Second Defense 
No report of the accident was submitted to defendant 
until after LaMar was served with a ten da)' summons 
on or about December 16, 1953. On January 7, 1954, as a 
part of an investigation concerning the accident, written 
statements were prepared and signed by both LaMar 
and Keith. These statements were written by one Wilde, 
an investigator employed by defendant, during the course 
of conversations related by them giving in detail the 
facts concerning the accident. The statements were in 
many respects. quite similar. They first related the facts 
concerning the driving of the cars. Then in relating how 
the accident happened they stated that LaMar while 
rounding the S curve may have been driving faster than 
he should but that his driving at no time was erratic and 
that at all times he kept his car on his right hand side of 
the highway; that as he rounded the curve they observed 
for the first time a large truck about 70 :feet distant 
travelling eastward and rounding the curve; that it was 
approaching on its left hand side of the highway im-
mediately in front of LaMar; that in order to avoid a 
collision LaMar pulled quickly to his right off the travel-
ed portion of the highway and struck the rocky precipi-
tous wall which arose almost perpendicularly at the 
outer edge of the highway; that thereupon LaMar lost 
control of his car and struck the protective guard rail 
on the opposite side of the highway and that the striking 
of the guard rail was what caused Verne to sustain the 
injuries of which he complained. 
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Based upon these two written statements given free-
ly by the two eye witnesses concerning the accident and 
who were incidentally the only known eye witnesses (as 
Verne was lying down in the back seat and did not see 
the accident), the insurance company believed that La-
Mar's negligence, if any, in driving faster than he should 
was not the proximate cause of the accident but that the 
intervening act of the driver of the eastbound truck in 
crowding them off the highway was the proximate cause 
of the accident and that consequently both LaMar and 
his company had a meritorious case. Defendant likewise 
concluded that there was a serious question as to whether 
or not the exclusion provision of its policy would apply 
in view of the facts outlined above as to the relationship 
of the parties. Defendant thereupon requested and re-
ceived from LaMar a "Reservation of its Rights Agree-
ment" and upon procuring the same it accepted the de-
fense of the action. Shortly thereafter the business failed 
an4 LaMar left the State of Utah, presumably heavily 
indebted, knowing that the suit against him and the com-
pany was then pending in the court. His wife remained 
in Ogden for some time. 
LaMar had e1nployed an attorney, E. Morgan Wixom 
of Ogden, Utah, to represent him and the company con-
cerning various legal problems in connection with the 
operation and winding up of the business and he also 
consulted with Wixom with respect to the signing of the 
Reservation of Rights Agreen1ent. After leaving the 
State LaMar never communic.ated with the defendant or 
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let it know where he was residing and although his ad-
dress was known to his wife, his father and Wixom, 
neither of these parties would reveal to defendant his 
whereabouts. The case was duly and regularly set for 
trial for November 18, 1954. Defendant had made several 
efforts to obtain LaMar's address without success. It had 
addressed letters both to the wife. and to Wixom. The 
letter to the wife was returned unclaimed, she having 
in the meantime left Ogden. The letter to Wixom was 
never answered. Finally Attorney LeRoy B. Young, who 
was representing the defendant, learned that Wixom 
knew his address. Upon contacting Wixom he furnished 
Young the address upon condition that he Young would 
not reveal to anyone outside of his office this informa-
tion, whereupon on September 28, 1954, Young wrote 
Pearce the following letter which was registered, to-wit: 
"Mr. LaMar Pearce 
302 H. Street 
Antioch, California 
"Re: 
vs. 
"Dear Mr. Pearce: 
Verne J. Oberhansly 
LaMar Pearce 
"Permit me to advise you that this case has 
been set for trial for November 18, 1954, at 10 :00 
o'clock A.M. I am writing you at this time so that 
you will have ample notice of the date and place 
of this trial. It is imperative that you be here by 
not later than November 17th and that you im-
mediately report to our office upon your arrival 
so that we will have the benefit of a conference 
together in advance of trial. 
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"You realize, of course, that under the terms 
of your policy you are required to give full co-
operation to the insurance company in the defense 
of· this action. 
"May I hear from you immediately so that I 
will know that you have received this letter and 
advise me if we can count on you being here on 
November 17, 1954. 
"Yours very truly, 
"YOUNG, THATCHER & 
GLASMANN 
"LeRoy B. Young." 
";LaMar received this letter on October 1, 1954. He 
never answered. the same nor did he make any effort to 
~ontact the defendant. However, so1ne time later La-
Mar's father called Young by phone and advised him 
that he had just talked to Lal\1:ar by phone and that 
LaMar had requested him to advise Young that he, La-
Mar, would not or could not come to the trial because of 
his job. Young then requested and obtained from the 
father a promise that he would call La:hriar and explain 
to him the need of his being present and a request that 
he reconsider the matter and attend the trial. ·The father 
promised Young he would do so, and he did thereafter 
call LaMar and conveyed this 1nessage to him. However, 
LaMar did not write either Young or the insurance com-
pany and made no further explanation as to his inten-
tions. As the thne for the trial "~as approaching and 
Young not having received any direct reply to his letter 
or to th~ request relayed through the father, then con-
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tacted Wixom and asked him to intercede and try to per-
suade LaMar to come. In compliance with this request 
Wixom on October 27, 1954, wrote LaMar the following 
letter: 
"Dear LaMar: 
''Mr. LeRoy B. Young has informed me that 
you advised him that you would not be present for 
the trial of the action brought against you and 
LaMar Pearce Auto Mart by Mr. Oberhansly for 
injuries he sustained in an automobile collision. 
I think LaMar that you should use every effort 
to make it to the trial. You are your own best 
witness and if you do not cooperate with your 
insurance company and appear at the trial, your 
chances to be reimbursed by the insurance are 
very slim. 
"If it is money that bothers you and you can-
not afford to get here, if you will wrjte to Mr. 
Young and tell him, maybe the insurance company 
will pay your express although they are not 
obligated to do so. 
"I hope that you are all getting along alright 
by now. Give my regards to your wife and best 
regards to you. 
''Yours very truly, 
"E. Morgan Wixom." 
LaMar admitted in his deposition, which was taken 
in California just before the trial of this action, that he 
received this letter. He further admitted that his reason 
for not coming was not due to the fact that he had not 
been tendered costs or expenses. LaMar did not reply 
to this letter written by his own attorney strongly ad-
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vising him to appear at the trial, nor did he communicate 
with either defendant or Young. At no time did LaMar 
request or indicate that if a continuance were obtained 
he might arrange to be present. In fact in his deposition 
in reply to a direct question propounded by plaintiff's 
attorney, Mr. Alsup, he said: 
"Q. Now why was it impossible for you to come 
to Ogden at the time you received this letter 
and were told when the trial was to be held~ 
A. Mainly from the standpoint of competition in 
any job or in any field of endeavor that you 
get into today you just-to go into your em-
ployer and tell him you are requested to ap-
pear at a trial 800 miles away and being 
more or less an unknown as far as he was 
concerned, it is not going to be anything but 
a reflection against your character and your 
ability. Keep on the job you are striving to 
do. 
Q. Now state whether or not your leaving at that 
time would have jeopardized your chance at 
getting your promotion. 
A. It would have jeopardized my chance defin-
itely. 
Q. Now would it have not been possible and 
easier for you to eon1e to Ogden to this trial 
at a later date~ 
A. It could possibly have been arranged, yes. 
Still you must realize gentlemen, in this auto~ 
mobile business today, I mean not only in the 
automobile business, but in any business with 
competition sueh as it is, to leave a location 
for-it would have taken a week to have-
10 
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would have impaired my chances or could 
have disrupted my whole chance of remaining 
there as a steady employee." 
Later on LaMar made the following statement: 
"Might I state this gentlemen, that frankly 
I thought my written statement, my signed writ-
ten statement orally read would have takep. care 
of my position being at the trial. I felt that that 
was sufficient. The facts were stated. That was 
what it amounts to." 
LaMar admitted that he never at any ti1ne wrote 
either Young or the insurance company requesting them 
to obtain a continuance of the trial nor advising them 
when he could appear if a continuation was obtained, nor 
did he inquire as to whether or not his written state1nent 
could be used in lieu of his appearance. It is fair to 
assume, we think, from his attitude and from his answers 
contained in the deposition that it was not a question of 
coming at some later date but that he had no intention 
of ever coming back to Utah to testify at the trial. He 
does not contend that he ever even so much as asked his 
employer if he might obtain a leave for a short time in 
order to enable him to appear as a witness in the trial. 
Instead of taking a week he could, of course, have come 
by air, attended a trial which only consumed two day's 
time and could have returned to his employment with an 
absence of not more than two days. Instead of doing this 
he took it upon himself to conclude that he would neither 
write the company nor its attorney nor would he appear 
at the trial. 
11 
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It is important to bear this in mind by reason of 
some of the contentions being made by the plaintiff in 
this case. 
On the date set for the trial LaMar did not appear. 
Defendant, however, did not do what many insurance 
companies have done when confronted with this situa-
tion. Defendant did not walk out and allow a default 
judgment to be entered for possibly $50,000, but defend-
ant conducted the best defense it could without any aid, 
assistance or testimony by La~far and the jury returned 
a verdict for $9,112.23. 
At the ti1ne of the trial Verne called his brother 
Keith as a witness. His testimony was in certain respects 
totally at variance with his written statement. In the 
written statement both he and LaMar had stated that 
Verne was given $10.00 and his dinner for driving the 
car. Nothing was said about his using this n1oney for 
gas and oil and buying dinners for the thre€ of the1n 
although the vvhole subject \Vas discussed in detail with 
Wilde. He also stated that La~Iar in rounding the curve 
swung wide over and into his left hand side of the high-
'vay and that the truck was approaching on its O\Yn side 
of the highway. He ad1nitted that this testin1ony \Vas in 
direct conflict with his \Yritten staten1ents but had the 
effrontery to say he made untrue state1nents to the ad-
juster in an atte1npt to help La:\Iar. It is quite apparent 
therefore that \vithout the help and assistance of La~Iar 
and without the benefit of his testin1ony defendant could 
do nothing except to try to keep the da1nages as lo"\\7 as 
possible. 
12 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. The Court erred in entering its Finding 
No. 5 for the reason that it is not supported by the evi-
dence but is contrary to all of the evidence in the case. 
POINT 2. The Court erred in entering the follow-
ing portion of Finding No. 6: 
"But he did not fail to cooperate with the 
defendant insurance company, nor did he fail to 
comply with the terms of said insurance contract," 
for the reason that said finding is not supported by the 
evidence in the case but is contrary to the uncontradicted 
evidence. 
POINT 3. The Court erred in making and entering 
its Conclusion of Law No. 1 for the reason it is not sup-
ported by the evidence. It is contrary to all of the evi-
dence in the case and is against law. 
POINT 4. The Court erred in entering its judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff for the su1n of $9,780.48 and in 
entering a judgment for any amount for the reason said 
judgment is not supported by the evidence but is con-
trary thereto and is against law. 
POINT 5. The Court erred in not making and en-
tering Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
ment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff for the 
reason that such a judgment would be supported by all 
of the evidence and would be in accordance with law. 
13 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS 
FINDING NO. 5 F·OR THE REASON THAT IT IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BU'T IS ·CON.TRARY TO ALL 
OF THE EVIDEN·CE IN THE CASE. 
The Court found in Finding Number 5 "at the time 
plaintiff herein suffered said accidental injuries he was 
riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by said 
LaMar Pearce and he was not an employee of said in-
sured within the meaning of that word as used in the 
policy and as quoted in paragraph 4 hereof, nor were 
the insureds liable for any injuries under any \V ork-
man's Compensation Law." 
The provision of the policy relied upon by appellant 
is quoted in Finding Number 4, whereby there is excluded 
from the provisions of the policy (a) any employee of 
the insured while engaged in the employment of the in-
sured, and (b) one whose injury benefits are payable or 
required to be provided under any W orlanan's Compen-
sation Law. 
It is the position of the appellant that under the 
uncontradicted evidence plaintiff "\vas an employee of 
Pearce Auto Mart both (a) under the comn1on la"\\~, and 
(b) under the v'l orkman's Compensation Act of the 
State of Utah. 
We think respondent "~ill admit that if plaintiff was 
an employee of the Auto 1\Iart "\Yhile driYing the auto-
mobile fro1n Ogd<.>n to Evanston, that this relationship 
continued as a part of the san1e employment on the re-
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turn trip so that we shall discuss this phase of the ques-
tion from the relationship which was created in the first 
instance. 
Under the admitted facts as outlined let us assume 
that plaintiff while driving this car from Ogden to 
Evanston had injured a third party through his negli-
gent operation of the automobile. Can anyone doubt 
that that injured party could have recovered judgment 
against the Auto Mart~ If so, it would be on the theory 
of respondeat superior. Let us further assume that the 
plaintiff had filed an application with the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah for an award for the 
injuries sustained by him. Can there be any doubt that 
he would have obtained an award from the Industrial 
Commission based upon the theory that he had sustained 
an injury arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment~ 
We think not and yet recovery under either of the 
assumed stated facts would have to be upon the basis of 
a relationship of employer-employee or master and 
servant. 
It is to be noted that the exclusion provision applies 
to any employee of the insured while engaged in the 
employment of the insured and also to anyone whose 
injury benefits are payable or required to be provided 
under any Workman's Compensation Law, so that the 
exclusion applies if under the laws of this State plaintiff 
was an employee of the insured or if he was includable 
15 
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as an employee under the Workman's Compensation Act 
irrespective of whether his employer carried workman's 
compensation or not. 
What facts are to be considered in defining the rela-
tionship of employer and employee under the co1nmon 
law as declared by this Court~ We have a number of 
cases discussing this question. We shall cite a few of 
them, 
Wahlen v. lT.P.R.R., 50 Utah 450, 168 Pac. 99. 
In this case the defendant contended that when de-
ceased quit work in the mine the relationship of master 
and servant ceased to exist between him and the coin-
pany and that when he boarded the man trip and at the 
time he '\\'as killed the relation between him and the 
company was that of a. carrier and passenger rather than 
master and_ servant and therefore the assumption of risk 
rule had no application. This court in answering this 
proposition stated: 
"We do not so agree. The relation of master 
and servant continued to exist until the employees 
boarding the Inan trap 'vere taken to the surface 
of the Inine, deposited fro1n the cars and were 
no longer 'ltJ~der the control of the conzpa.ny or 
amenable to its rules and re.r;ulations.'~ 
Citing three other l_Ttah cases: 
J achetta Y. San Pedro, 36 "[Ttah -±70, 105 Pac. 
100: 
Gro\v v. O.S.L., 44 Utah 160, 138 Pae. 398: 
Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 93 {Ttah 577, 74 
Pac. ~nd 12~5. 
16 
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The Gleason case is noteworthy because while· this 
court held in that case that under the factual situation 
relation of master and servant did not in fact exist, yet 
the court "\vith the greatest of care discusses the neces-
sary elen1ents in creating this relationship and lists the 
following five elements : 
1. Right to exercise control over the details of the 
work. 
2. Payment of compensation. 
3. Power of appointment. 
4. Power of dismissal. 
5. For whose benefit the given work was done. 
The Court then says that the first element, that is, 
the right to exercise control over the details of the work 
in the last analysis must al"\vays determine what was 
the essential nature of the relationship between the per-
. son who performed the given work and the person for 
\vhose benefit it was performed. The other elements 
are merely r.orro borative of the first if the first is 
shown to be present; and if the first element cannot be 
shown directly, the other elements are indicative of con-
ditions which imply that control over the worker was in 
fact exercised by the person declared to be the master. 
We think the foregoing statement is universally 
accepted by the courts, that is, in determining whether 
or not the relation of master and servant exists, this 
element of the right to exercise control is, in the final 
analysis, the concluding test and the other four elements 
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may be looked to merely as an aid in assisting the court 
to determine the ultimate question as to whether or not 
the right to control was present. 
Phelps v. Boone, 67 Fed. 2nd 574, 
wherein the court says: 
"The usual test in such circumstances, that is 
to say, the detennination of liability for negligent 
~ct on the part of a servant is t.J11e right or power 
on the part of the person charged to command and 
control the servant in the performance of the 
causal act at the moment of performance." 
Badertscher v. Independent Ice Company, 
55 Utah 100, 184 Pac. 181. 
This is another very interesting Utah case in which the 
question for determination was 'vhether certain drivers 
were employees of the ice company or the coal company 
and this court held that at the time in question he "'as 
an agent of the coal company although he was an actual 
employee of the ice company and was paid his wages by 
said company. 
Murray v. ''r asatch Grading Company, 73 
Utah 430, 27 4 Pac. 940. 
In this case the question arose as to 'vhether the plaintiff 
was an en1ployee of the defendant or of the D. & R. G. 
Railroad Company. The defendant carried '\vorkman's 
compensation on its O'\vn e1nployees and did not list plain-
tiff as one of its e1nployees. He was paid his salary by 
the railroad co1npany. This court posed the question as 
to whether plaintiff was an en1ployee of the defendant 
grading co1npany or of the railroad con1pany. The 
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co_urt again lists the five elements to- be considered and 
then states : 
"However, the ultimate question is, was the 
person in question engaged in the discharge of 
the duties of a servant of another- and was that 
service accepted by that other. Was such service· 
rendered and accepted~ If so, the law implies 
the contract of master and servant between the 
latter and former of employer and employee and 
the existence of that relationship between them." 
And this court held as a matter of law that the relation 
of master and servant existed between plaintiff and the 
grading company. 
It is to be noted that in all of these cases as well as 
cases eminating from many other jurisdictions that the 
ultimate question is not whether the alleged employer 
did in fact exercise control but the question is did he 
retain the right of control~ 
We submit that under the facts of this case where 
the plaintiff was asked to drive this car that the person 
soliciting him to do so clearly retained the right to con-
trol him in the manner and performance of his duties 
even though he did not in fact exercise that right and 
had no occasion to do so, and the fact that Pearce follow-
ed plaintiff from Echo to Evanston is significant as evi-
dence that he did in fact retain that control. 
We say therefore that under the common law as it 
has been announced by repeated decisions of this court 
that it must be determined as a matter of law that when 
plaintiff was requested to drive this car to Evanston 
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that he was then engaged in the discharge of the duties 
of a servant of the Auto Mart; that his service was ac-
cepted by said Auto Mart ; that he was performing a 
duty in the regular and customary discharge of the com-
pany's business and that from this relationship there can 
be no question but what the right of control did in fact 
exist. Even though the employment was for a short dura-
tion of time and related only to the delivery of this car, 
that fact in and of itself is not determinative of the issue. 
The question presented is whether or not at the time 
of the accident did such relationship exist. 
Workmen's Compensation Law 
As heretofore noted, the insurance poliey does not 
apply if the plaintiff was an employee under the provi-
sions of the W orlo:nen's Compensation Law of the State 
of Utah or if the insured would be held liable under the 
provisions of said la"\v. This requires an analysis of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Utah. 
Preliminary may we suggest to this court that under 
its repeated pronouncements the purpose of enacting the 
Workmen's Con1pensation La"\v 'vas to protect persons 
against the hazards incident to en1ployment and if a 
person is injured "rhile perforn1ing the duties assigned 
to him, it is considered right and proper that industry 
should absorb the loss just the srune as it does with re-
spect to depletion and depreciation in n1achinery and 
equip1nent a1"td that the length of tinze of employment 
is i1nmaterial. The ultilnate question always is "\vhether 
or not the alleged employee \vas injured "\vhile in the dis-
eharge of the duties he \vas directed to perform. If he 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was so injured, then he or his dependents are entitled 
to the benefits provided by the Act. In order to deter~ 
mine whether or not an alleged accident is compensable, 
the first proposition to determine is whether or not the 
alleged employer comes within the perview of the Act. 
If he does not, then the Commission has no jurisdiction 
over the matter. Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. 1953, defines 
employers as follows : 
"Every person, firm and private corporation 
having in service one or more workmen or opera-
tives regularly employed in the same business or 
in and about the same esetablishment under any 
contract of hire, express or ilnplied, oral or writ-
ten." 
It is admitted in this case that the Auto Mart had 
one or more workmen regularly employed. Therefore, 
the alleged employer came within the provisions of the 
Act. Then Legislature defines "regularly" as follows: 
"The term regularly as herein used shall in-
clude all employments in the usual course of the 
trade, business, profession or occupation of the 
employer, whether continuous throughout the 
year or for only a portion of the year. One can be 
regularly employed even though but for a short 
period of time if he is engaged in the performance 
of the duties incident to the business of the em-
ployer." 
Section 35-1-43, U.C.A. 1953, defines "casual ern-
ployment" as follows : 
"Subdivision 2. Every person, except agri-
cultural laborers and domestic servants, in the 
service of any employer as defined in subdivision 
2 of Section 35-1-42 who employes one or more 
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workmen or operatives regularly in the same busi-
ness or in or about the same establishment under 
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written, including aliens and minors whether 
legally or illegally working for hire, but not in-
cluding any person whose employment is but 
casual and not in the usual course of trade, busi-
ness or occupation of his employment." 
It will be noted therefore that an employee includes 
every .~ituation where the employer employs one or more 
workmen or operatives in the same business or in or 
about the same establishment under any contract of hire, 
express or implied, oral or written, whether legal or il-
legal,· and then the statute by its express terins excludes 
only any person whose employr.aent is but casual and 
not in th~e usual course of trade, business or occupation 
of his employer. 
The underscored language above is very significant. 
It is to be noted that the statute above quoted does not 
use the term employee or servant but relates to workmen 
or operatives and is all inclusive provided the employer 
regularly employs one or 1nore in his trade or business. 
It is also to be noted that under the terms of this statute 
the only persons \vho are excluded are persons whose eln-
ployment is but casual and not in the usual course of 
trade, business or occupation of the e1nployer. If, there-
fore, a workn1an's work is but casual, he is excluded as 
an employee only if the \vork "~hich he is called upon to 
perforn1 is not in the usual course of trade, business or 
occupation of his employer. 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The evidence in this case without any dispute shows 
that the work which this plaintiff was requested to per-
form was work done in the usual course of the trade, 
business or occupation of the Auto Mart. If the casual 
work done was in the usual course of the trade or busi-
ness, then even though casual and even though for a short 
duration of time he comes 'vithin the provisions of the 
Act. 
Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 47, 
7 Pac. 2nd 284. 
In this case the court construed the provision above re-
ferred to and in doing so refers to the conjunction "and," 
and says that it cannot substitute the conjunction "or," 
so that under the express wording of this statute the only 
persons excludable are those casually employed in work 
which is not in the usual course of the trade. Note the 
following: 
"By Section 3111, now 35-1-43, the employees 
who are excluded are those whose employment is 
but casual and is not in the usual course of trade, 
business or occupation of his employer. That is, 
to exclude an employee the employment must not 
'only be casual but must also not be in the usual 
course of the trade or business of the employer. 
"This, it seems, but emphasizes the fact that 
a casual or occasional employment in the usual 
course of the trade or business of the employer 
does not exclude the employee. 
· "Had the Legislature in Section 3111 used or 
instead of and, the meaning might well be dif-
ferent, but we are not justified in substituting 
the one for the other." 
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There are several other Utah cases which we desire 
to cite which deal with this question of when and under 
what circumstances the relationship of employer-employ-
ee exists under the provisions of our Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. See 
Weber County and Ogden City v. Industrial 
Commission, 93 Utah 85, 71 Pac. 2nd 
177; 
Auerbach v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 
347, 195 Pac. 2nd 245. 
In this case the court again refers to the test as being 
primarily whether or not the right of control is retained 
by the employer. 
Summerville v. Industrial Commjssion, 113 
Utah 504, 196 Pac. 2nd 718. 
In this case the court in discussing this problem of casual 
employment states that the test is whether the services 
rendered are necessary to or in furtherance of employer's 
usual trade, business or occupation. 
Certainly under the undisputed evidence in this case 
the service which the plaintiff was rendering for this 
company was necessary to its business and was in the 
furtherance of its trade, business or occupation. 
We contend therefore that finding of fact number 5 
is contrary to the undisputed evidence and that as a 
matter of law the plaintiff was included in the exclusion 
provision of the policy and that the court should have 
found such to be the fact. 
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POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE 
FOLLOWING PORTION OF FINDING NO. 6: 
"BUT HE DID NOT FAIL T'O COOPERATE WITH 
THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY, NOR 
DID HE FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF 
SAID IN1SURANCE CONTRACT." 
Before discussing this matter we desire to emphasize 
that counsel will no doubt argue that the defendant in-
surance company failed to exercise due diligence in ob-
taining the cooperation of Pearce and he will no doubt 
cite some cases discussing this question. While we con-
tend that the evidence in this case shows conclusively 
that defendant by its agents and attorneys did exercise 
due diligence and acted in the utmost good faith in an 
attempt to obtain the cooperation of Pearce and to pro-
cure his presence at the trial, yet we call attention to 
this important fact : The trial court made no finding as 
to whether or not defendant acted with due diligence and 
such question is not within any issue within this case. 
The court found only that Pearce "did not fail to co-
operate with defendant nor did he fail to comply with 
the terms of said contract." The judgment in this case 
is bottomed solely upon this finding and must stand or 
fall on this one proposition, to-wit: Did Pearce cooperate 
in the defense of this action~ All other questions are 
outside the issues and the findings. The question whether 
the insured used due diligence is in the nature of an 
estoppel which must be pleaded and proved and upon 
which findings would have to be made if plaintiff relies 
upon such estoppel. 
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Proceeding now with a discussion of the question 
it seems to us that the finding of the court that Pearce 
did not fail to cooperate and that he did not fail to com-
ply with the terms of the contract is not supported bv 
any evidence, but that on the contrary the evidence is 
conclusive that he did fail to cooperate and that he did 
fail to comply with the terms of the contract. The con-
dition of the liability insurance policy in question is set 
forth in Sections 6 and 13 and is copied into Finding 
Number 4. Unlike the provisions of some of the policies 
which are set forth in the cases hereinafter to be cited, 
paragraph 6 requires the insured to attend hearings and 
trials as well as to cooperate with the company in effect-
ing settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining 
the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of the 
suit, and Section 13 provides that no action shall lie 
against the company unless as a condition precedent 
thereto the insured shall have fully complied with all 
the terms of the policy. 
We first desire to call to the court's attention the 
fact that this action is what is deno1ninated by the courts 
as a derivative action for the benefit of the insured 
rather than a case where the policy itself creates a pri-
mary liability. A primary liability arises in cases where 
a statute or city ordinance requires as a condition pre-
cedent to obtaining a license to operate that the applicant 
must furnish a public liability bond in the form required 
by the statute or ordina.n(le for the benefit of the public. 
This is called a prin1ary liability as distinguished fron1 
th~ casP "~her~in assured volnntaril~? obtains insurance 
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for his own protection but is not required to do so. We 
have no compulsory insurance law in this state. In the 
case of 
Goldstein v. Burnstein, 52 N.E. 2nd 559, 
the court in discussing this question says: 
"Their rights (third parties) in the indem-
nity, however, were derivative and if, by breach 
of the provisions of the policy of the insure.d, the 
company was discharged from its obligation to 
indemnify her, it was likewise relieved of any 
obligation to pay the plaintiffs. It has been said 
that the rights of the third persons injured to. 
have recourse to the indemnity promised by the 
company do not rise any higher than those of the 
insured." Citing cases. 
See also 
Salonen v. Paanenen, 71 N.E. 2d 227; 
Royal Indemnity Company v. Olmstead, 193 
Fed. 2d 451, 31 A.L.R. 2nd 635, and an-
notations. 
In cases of derivative actions the courts agree that 
such a condition is a material one and that its breach 
constitutes a good defense against the insured and also 
as against an injured third party who claims there-
under. See 
137 A.L.R. 1008, 
wherein the general rule of law is stated to be as follows: 
"The authorities are in practical unimity on 
this subject. A clause in an insurance policy re-
quiring the insured's cooperation, aid and assist-
ance in a defense of an action against him is a ma-
terial condition of a policy, the violation of which 
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by the insured forfeits his rights to claim indem-
nity_ under the policy. It is a condition precedent, 
failure of which to perform in the absence of 
waiver of estoppel constitutes a defense to lia-
bility on the policy." 
Stacey v. F and C of New York, 151 N.E. 
718; 
Royal Indemnity Company v. Morris, 37 Fed. 
2d 90; 
29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Page 1090. 
Applying the Iule as announced by all of the fore-
going authorities it is proper to then first address our-
selves to the rights of the insured Pearce under this con-
tract of insurance in the light of the undisputed evidence. 
Let us assume that Pearce or his company was not insol-
vent and that he or the company had paid the judgment 
and then sought by this action to recoup their loss under 
his insurance policy. It seems to us that under such a 
state of facts no court would permit a recovery under 
the facts revealed by this record and if Pearce or his 
company could not recover, then this plaintiff's rights 
can rise no higher, and therefore he ought not to recover. 
As heretofore pointed out, this policy required 
Pearce in addition to cooperating to also upon the com-
pany's request attend hearings and trials. It is admitted 
that Pearce did not attend the trial and that he rendered 
rio assistance whatsoever to the insurance company in its 
defense of this action. 
We believe that this is a case of first impression in 
this court. However, it is a 1natter that has been before 
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many courts, both State and Federal. The factual situa-
tion, of course, is different, but the rule of law governing 
the facts is pretty clear and defined. Keeping in mind 
that we are discussing merely the proposition as to 
whether or not the insured complied with the terms of 
the policy, what are the facts. Unlike some of the cases 
where the insured left the state and his presence could 
not be found, Pearce admits that on the 1st day of Octo-
ber, 1953, he received official notice by registered mail of 
the letter which informed him of the date and place of 
trial and which requested his presence, so this court is 
not confronted with a situation where the insured re-
ceived no notice of the hearing. He admits that he did 
not attend the trial, so to that extent it must be admitted 
that unless he was prevented from attending the trial 
by circumstances beyond his control he breached the con-
tract. There is no contention that he was prevented from 
attending the trial by reason of sickness, inclement 
weather, inability to travel or anything of that nature. 
He merely says that the reason that he did not come was 
due to his employment ; that his own chances for advance-
ment might have been jeopardized had he requested of 
his employer a few days to appear as a witness. In other 
words it was a case of measuring his own convenience 
with the demands of the policy. He does not contend that 
he even asked his employer for permission to attend the 
trial. He admits that he never at any time communicated 
directly with either the insurance company or its attor-
ney. He never at any time suggested that if a continu-
ance was asked for, that he might come at some later 
date. In fact he decided without consultation or advice 
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that because he had given a written statement to the in-
surance company that his presence at the trial was un-
necessary. It seems to us that the mere statement of the 
situation discloses an utter disregard of the duties and 
obligations of the insured which constituted a willful 
refusal to cooperate in any degree whatsoever in the de-
fense of the action. 
Was his presence necessary~ In the written state-
ments. furnished the company both by Pearce and Keith 
Oberhansly they had stated that this accident was 
caused by reason of the oncoming truck rounding the 
curve on the outside or left hand side of the highway 
the~e.by .forcing Pearce to pull to his right to avoid a 
collision. If this fact was true, then the intervening negli-
gence of the driver of that truck was the proximate cause 
of the accident and Pearce's testimony was absolutely 
necessary to prove this fact, and that was especially 
true when Keith Oberhansly took the stand as a witness 
for his brother and changed his testimony from that 
given in his written statement. 
Counsel will suggest no doubt that defendant should 
have taken Pearce's deposition. However, under the 
terms of the policy the insured was required to attend 
in person and not by deposition. The facts in this case 
disclose how ineffective a deposition in advance of trial 
would have been. Defendant at that time would not have 
known or anticipated that Keith Oberhansly would 
change his statement and the subjert matter would not 
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and could not have been covered or met in his deposition. 
This matter of taking depositions is discussed in the case 
of 
Horton v. Employer's Liability Assurance 
Corporation, 164 S.W. 2nd 1011, 
wherein the court says: 
"The company was entitled to the presence of 
the defendant at the trial to meet any surprise 
testimony in contravention of the statements 
given by the witness, and for this purpose the 
company contracted for the defendant's presence 
at the trial." 
We shall not atternpt to review the many cases deal-
ing with this question. The factual situation is in many 
respects · different from the facts in this case, but the 
cases are important in that the law is pretty definitely 
established. 
Fischer v. Western and Southern Indemnity 
Company, 106 S.W. 2d 490; 
Shalita v. American Motorists Insurance 
Company, 41 NYS 2nd 507; 
Cameron v. Berger, 1 Atl. 2nd 529; 
Indemnity Company of North America v. 
Smith, 78 Atl. 2nd 461; 
Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Com-
pany, 160 N.E. 367; 
Glens Falls Indemnity Company v. Keliher, 
187 Atl. 473; 
McDaniels v. General Insurance Company of 
America, 36 Pac. 2nd 829 ; 
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, Eakle v. Hayes, 55 Pac. 2d 1072; 
Hynding v. ·Home Accident Insurance Com .. 
pany, 7 Pac. 2nd 999; 
Ass~ciated Indemnity Corporation v. Davis, 
45 F. Sup. 118; 
Schoenfeld v. New Jersey Fidelity and Plate, 
Glass Insurance Company, 197 NYS 606. 
The Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company 
case is p3:rticularly interesting and persuasive because 
the opinion. was· written by Mr. Justice Cordozo and his 
observation is ·quoted in subsequent cases. Note the fol-
lowing in speaking of lack of cooperation : 
. ' 
"In diver's ways there might be defense to a 
charge of negligence, or at all events, palliation, 
though mistakes were conceded.. The default of 
the insured was more than sluggishness or in-
difference, phases of thought or conduct th~t 
might be the subject of various inferences when 
, _ considered by a jury. It was so avowed an-d pur-
posed that htt,t pne inference is possible. If this 
was cooperation, one is at a loss to imagine when 
cooperation ·would be lacking." 
Justice Cordozo again uses the following language: 
·"The argument misconceives the effect of 
a refusal. Cooperation with the insurer is one 
of the conditions of the policy. When the condi-
tion was broken the policy was at an end if the 
insurer so elected. The case is not one of the 
breach of a mere covenant where the consequence 
nuiy vary with fluctuation of the da1nage. There 
has been a failure to fulfill a condition upon which 
obligation is dependent." 
Annotations are found in 
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72 A.L.R. 1448 at Page 1469; 
98 A.L.R. 1465 at Page 1475. 
Defendant pleaded as a further affirmative defense 
that Pearce, his business associate or partner, Keith 
Oberhansly, and the plaintiff, Oberhansly's brother, con-
spired to assist plaintiff in procuring this judgment. It 
may be as the trial court observed that the evidence 
was insufficient to prove a conspiracy. The evidence, 
however, did establish a reason for Pearce's refusal to 
cooperate and to attend the trial. He and his company 
were insolvent. There were already many creditors. 
One more judgment creditor would be of little or no con-
sequence. Keith Obers.hansly, his associate, apparently 
had nothing, but in any event this insurance policy was 
ample protection. Pearce and Keith Oberhansly were 
business associates. The brother, Verne Oberhansly, 
was a close friend of Pearce. Pearce and Keith Ober-
hansly gave written statements shortly after the acci-
dent, which, in a measure at least, exonerated Pearce, but 
a simple expediency of Keith Oberhansly changing his 
testimony and Pearce not appearing in his own defense 
enabled the plaintiff to obtain a judgment. In the lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Cordozo, "If this conduct was co-
operation, one is at a loss to imagine when cooperation 
would be lacking." 
We contend therefore that the finding of the court 
that, "Pearce did not fail to cooperate with the defendant 
insurance company nor did he fail to comply with the 
terms of said insurance contract," finds no support 
whatsoever in the evidence, and that the evidence con-
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elusively establishes as a matter of law that Pearce 
breached the contract by refusing to attend the trial and 
by failing to cooperate in the defense of the action and 
that as a matter of law the defendant is entitled to pre-
"l va1.. .. 
As heretofore suggested, counsel \vill no doubt argue 
that the defendant did not exercise due diligence, but 
as we have already indicated, such an issue is wholly 
outside any issues in this case and wholly outside any 
findings as made by the court. However, if this court 
should disagree with this, then it becomes necessary 
to comment briefly upon this question. Counsel suggests: 
1. That defendant should have asked for a continu-
ance. 
In order to have obtained a continuance it certainly 
would have been necessary for counsel to have made a 
bona fide showing that it was impossible to obtain the 
presence of the defendant at the trial. 'V e do not believe 
that counsel for defendant could have in good faith made 
such a showing. }fere inconvenience is hardly sufficient 
to justify the granting of a continuance. The fact that 
there is cornpetition in the auton1obile business hardly 
justifies a continuance. But, furthern1ore, Pearce at no 
tirne ever suggested that defendant ask for or obtain a 
continuance. He never at any tilue suggested that if 
a (•.ontinuance was obtained, he \vould appear at a subse-
quent date. Here again counsel for defendant could 
hardly in good faith ask for a continuance without being 
prepared to show that if a continuanre "Tere granted, 
')4 
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that the defendant would appear at a later date. Pearce 
in his deposition makes it rather clear that he had no 
intention of appearing at any time. Competition would 
always be present, he says, and furthermore he had given 
a written statement. What more was required, he says. 
The writer has a pretty distinct feeling that had he 
come in and asked for a continuance of this case-, that 
counsel for plaintiff who now suggests that a continuance 
should have been requested, would have been vociferous 
in his objections to the granting of a continuance. Fur-
thermore, the writer of this brief never was told di-
rectly that Pearce would not attend and I can state frank-
ly that I thought that he would put in an appearance 
at the time of trial. 
Did counsel exercise due diligence in trying to per-
suade Pearce to attend the trial~ He was given notice 
by registered mail approximately six weeks before trial 
of the date and place of trial and a request for his attend-
ance. When a roundabout rumor reached the "'Titer that 
he would not or could not attend, the writer requested his 
own father to call him back and explain to him the neces-
sity of appearing and the consequences of his failure to 
do so, but, furthermore, the writer then took the matter 
up with his own attorney who also interceded by lette·r 
to Pearce. It is true that the writer might have sent a 
representative of the company to visit him. Certainly 
the policy makes no such demands, but if the insured re-
fused to attend after being requested so to do by the 
insurance company's attorney, by his own father and by 
hi3 own attorney, we fail to see how some representative 
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of the company entirely unacquainted with Pearce could 
have accomplished what evidently his own father and 
his own attorney could not do. 
This is a. case where the insured left the State of 
Utah, and attempted to conceal his whereabouts, but 
his whereabouts was ascertained through the diligence 
of the defendant and he was promptly notified, but not-
withstanding this fact he refused to attend. We say, 
therefore, that if the issue as to the diligence and good 
faith of the defendant is an issue in this case, that the 
evidence discloses without question that the defendant 
did everything required by it under the terms of its 
policy and under the law to obtain the presence of the 
insured at the trial. 
POINTS 3, 4 and 5. The points raised by Points 3, 
4 and 5 have all-been fully discussed under Points 1 and 
2 and nothing further need be added. If appellant's posi-
tion on Points 1 and 2 is correct, then it must follow as 
a necessary consequence that the findings and judgment 
as entered by the trial court cannot be sustained and that 
judgment should be entered in favor of defendant dis-
missing the action. 
YOUNG, THATCHER 
& GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
1018 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
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